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CAiw et ux. v. WENTZE~ • 
L. A. 22028. 
Supreme Court of California, in Bank. 
Jan. 29, 1952. 
Hearing Granted Feb. 28, 1952.-
George E. Cary and Mabel Cary, husband 
and wife, bronght action against Lawrence 
Wentzel to recover for -injuries sustained in 
automobile accident. The Superior Court ot 
San Luis Obispo County, Ray B. Lyon, J., 
entered judgment tor plaIntiffs and order 
granting. plaintifl"s a new trial on damages 
issue only. and defe.odant appealed. The Su· 
preme Court, Traynor. J., held that inadequa-
cy of damages showed that verdict was result 
of a compromise, and that therefor granting 
ot limited new trial was abuse of discretion. 
Judgment and order reversed. 
Carter, :r., dissented. 
Prior opinion 230 P.2d 656. 
I. Appeal and Error <$:>979(5) 
An order granting a new trial on dam· 
ages issue only wilt be reversed on appeal 
when it is shown that damages awarded by 
jury are inadequate, issue of liability is 
close, any other circumstances indicate that 
verdict was probably the result of prejudice, 
sympathy or an improper compromise. 
2. Damagos $=>135 
Where three teeth of plaintiff had been 
broken and had to be extracted and others 
had been cracked and loosened, dentist's 
estimate that needed bridge work would 
cost $320 was not excessive. 
3. New Trial <lP9 
Where task of Jury in personal in-
jury, action with respect to liability was 
exceptionally difficult,and award for in-
juries was grossly inadequate, verdict was 
result of a compromise, _ and trial court 
abused its discretion in granting new trial 
on damages issue only. 
A. H. Brazil, San Luis Obispo, for ap-
pellant. 
Kenneth J. Thayer and Dorsett M. Phil-
lips, Bakersfield, for respondents. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
At about four o'clock on ,the afternoon 
of December 26, 1948, plaintiffs George and 
• Subsequent opinion 247 P.2d 341. 
Mabel Cary, husband and wife, were pta. 
ceeding west on Highway 41 approximately 
ten miles east of Paso Robles. Mr. Cary 
was driving. The pavement at that point 
was fourteen feet wide and "had a center 
line that separated the highway into two 
lanes, for traffic in each direction. The 
sky was overcast and it was drizzling. 
For several miles they had been following, 
at a distance of about 100 feet, -an automo-
bile owned and being driven by defendant, 
Lawrence Wentzel. Defendant's "olife and 
chi1d were riding with him. Both cars 
were traveling approximately 35 miles per 
hour. A third automobile was being driven 
in the opposite direction by Robert Seeling-
er, with whom Mrs. Dora Grove was riding 
as a guest. Defendarit's and Seelinger's 
cars collidedj and Seelinger's car swerved 
in front of and collided with plaintiffs' car. 
Mrs. Grove died several days later as a 
result of injuries received in the accident. 
Plaintiffs and Seelinger were injured and, 
their cars were damaged. 
It is conceded that plaintiffs -were not 
guilty of contributory negligence. The 
principal issue at the trial was whether de~ 
fendant or Seelinger was responsible for 
the first collision. Three witnesses (plain-
tiffs and Seelinger) testified that defend-
ant's car was being driven partly on the 
wrong side of the center line; two wit-
nesses (defendant and his wife) testified 
that Seelinger suddenly crossed the center 
line into' their path. 
Defendant was sued by Seelinger, by the 
heirs of Mrs. Grove, and by the Carys,. 
and the three suits were consolidated for 
trial. The jury found for defendant in 
the Seelinger and Grove actions and re-
turned a verdict for ·plaintiffs in the amount 
of $1,000 iri the Cary action. Seelinger did 
not move for a new trial and did not ap-
peal; the judgment against him is now 
final. Mrs. Grove's heirs were granted a 
new trial, but they later voluntarily dis-
missed their action. In the Cary case, de-
fendant's motion for a new trial was denied,. 
and plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the 
issue of damages only was granted. De-
fendant has appealed from the order grant-
ing a limited new trial and from the judg-
ment. He contends that the jury did not 
CABY v. WENTZEL," n : 305 
Cite as 240 P.2d 304 
actually dete~mine that he was negligent 75 per day). 'At no· time during the trial 
.- and that the verdict "against him was the was this expense-disputed. We cannot as-
result of sympathy or an improper compro- sume that the :jurors, :without evidence to 
_ mise. He therefore- seeks a new trial on all support them, speculated -concerning the 
issues. nature and extent of free :hospital _service 
given'by the Government to wives-of serv-[1] The principles that govern the 
granting of new ,trials limited 'to the dam- icemen.' n they had concluded that defend-
ant was negligent,. -they' would certainly 
ages issue were reviewed in Leipert v. have awarded plaintiffs -the cost of this 
H?nold, CaI.Sup" 240 P,Zd. 288: We there hospitalization; The expense of future 
pomted out that the questIon IS addressed d t I k Id t f b 'd fi 
. h"6; '-- - h . ena war cou no,o ,course, e e-
m t e rst Instance to t e sound discre- 't I" d t . d t th .' ft' I 
tion of the' trial co~rt~ . An Order grant- - m eye ermIne a' e. t~~e 0 _. na • 
. ch I"t d t . I " '11 b There can be no doubt, however, that such tng su a IIpi e new na WI e re-· k h' d 
, . . Wor ad been rna e necessary -by the· ac· 
versed, however, when It IS shown on ap· . 'd f th fMC' h h d 
. . CI ent or ree· 0 - rs. ary s teet a peal that the damages awarded by the JUry , 
. d t th' f r bTt . been broken and had had to be extracted 
are ma equa e, e Issue 0 13 1 1 Y 19· and others'"had been cracked arid loosened. 
close, and ,other circumstances indicate The only evidence' concerning the reason-
that the verdict was probably the result 
able value of the needed bridgework was 
of prejudice, sym~athy, or an improper -the testimony of .Mrs. Cary that her dentist 
compromise. had estimated the expense at $320. In view 
[2] (I) Inadequacy of. damages. De- of the undisputed injuries to her teeth, 
fendant contends .that -the $1,000 verdict this estimate was not exce'ssive. Cf. l{eogh 
was less than the undisputed special dam-" v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 18, 21, 125 
" ages and therefore could not have resulted P.2d 858. 
" from a decision by the jury that defend- It must be concluded that there was no 
ant was negligent. See Wallace v. Miller, legitimate reason that would have prompted 
26 Cal.App.2d 55, 56, 78 P.Zd 745; Mc- the jury to exclude the cost of hospitaliza-
Near v. Paci6c Greyhound Lines, 63 Cal. tion and future bridgework from the spe-
App.Zd 11, 16, 146 P.2d 34. The amount 
ciat damages necessarily to be allowed in 
of plaintiffs' special damages, however, is the event defendant were found liable. It 
disputed. Defendant contends that the follows that defendant is correct in his 
special damages shown totaled $1199.1 claim that the verdict for special damages 
Plaintiffs contend that only $704 special should have been $1199. The failure to 
damages were proved, so that the v~rdict 
, allowed $296 for general damages. The award this minimum amount is a convincing 
indication that the jury had not reached difference between these two versions of the conclusion that defendant was negti. 
the special damages results from defend- gent. 
ant's inclusion of $175 for hospital bins 
and $320 for future dental work. Plain-" Moreover, the jury should have allowed 
" tiffs suggest that the jury may have dis- general damages for plaintiffs' suffering, 
allowed the hospital .expenses because they inconvenience, and loss of time. Mrs. 
related to services that were 'rendered to Cary was seriously injured. _ She was 
Mrs. Cary by Army hospitals and for which thrown into the windshield, radio, and 
Mr. Cary, as a soldier, would not be liable. heater of their car and sustained lacerations 
There was no evidence, however, that would on her forehead, chin, tongue, the inside 
justify such action. The Carys testified of her mouth, and her left knee. In ad-
that bills from the Army had been received. dition there were the broken and loosened 
They agreed on tho length of time she had teeth already mentioned, and bruises on 
been hospitalized (three and a half months) her chest, shoulders, back, and legs. The 
and on the amount they were charged ($1.- cut on her chin left a scar. At the time 
"I. 'The figure claimed by defendant Is actually $1219, but it Is apparent that an inad-
vertent error of $20 bas been made. 
240 P,2d-!0 
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of the trial, almost a year and a half after (3) Other circumstances iudicating com-
the accident, she was still bedridden and promise. The verdic~ against Seelinger is 
continued to suffer pain in her back and not inconsistent with the verdict in favor of 
knee. A number of abscesses on her back plaintiffs, for the jury could have con-
developed and persisted to the time of eluded that defendant was negligent and 
trial; it is possible, however, that the jury that Seelinger was guilty of contributory 
concluded that these were related to an negligence. The court's instructions, how~ 
earlier disease (Uvalley fever") from which· ever, limited the issue of contributory neg~ 
she had been suffering. Whatever may ligence to the Seelinger suit; Mrs. Grove 
have been the cause of her continued gen- was a guest in Seelinger's car and his 
eral disability, it is clear that the injuries negligence would not be imputed to her. 
received in the accident were painful, ex- Reynolds v. Filomeo, 38 Cal2d 5, 236 P.2d 
tensive, and, in part at least, permanent. 801. The verdict against Mrs. Grove's 
Mr. Cary was also injured, but had sub- heirs is therefore at variance with the ver-
stantially recovered at the time of the trial. diet against defendant in the Cary action 
He was thrown against the -steering wheel, -the latter necessarily implies that de-
bending it six inches, and he sustained fendant was negligent whereas the former 
bruises and cuts on his head, chest, and implies that he was not One of these 
knee. verdicts is erroneous, and the gross in-
The failure of the jury to-allow substan .. adequacy of the award in the Cary case 
tial general damages for these injuries, suggests at once where the error lies. 
as well as for several weeks loss of Use of It is contended that the court's failure to 
the automobile during repairs, also indicates give a damages instruction in the Grove 
that the liability issue had not been decided. case was responsible for the verdict against 
See Toshio Hamasaki v. Flotho, Ca1.Sup., Mrs. Grove's heirs. This explanation is 
240 P.2d 298. not persuasive. Special damages covering 
(2) Evidenc. of liability. The jury had hospital and funeral expenses were proved 
only the testimony of the parties themselves by the executor of Mrs. Grove's estate 
from which to determine whether defend- and were at no time disputed by defendant; 
ant or Seelinger was driving on the wrong that much at least would have been allowed 
side of the road. Seelinger and plaintiffs by the jury. Moreover, during their de-
testified that defendant was at fault; de- liberations the jurors returned to the court-
fendant and his wife testified that Seelinger room for instructions on questions that 
was at fault. It is apparent that the jury's were causing difficulty. They would prob-
task with respect to this issue was excep- ably have sought similar aid from the court 
tionally difficult. with regard to the measure of damages had 
It is also significant that the -testimony they reached that issue and had difficulty in 
of Seelinger and plaintiffs was to a cer- determining it. 
tain extent inconsistent. Seelinger testified [4] We have concluded that the verdict 
that as his car approached defendant's car, against defendant in the Cary action was 
he saw defendant's left wheels a foot or the result of a compromise between jurors 
two over the center line for a distance of who believed that defendant should pay sub-
100 to 200 feet before the accident. Plain- stantial damages and jurors who believed 
tiffs testified, however, that defendant that he should pay none. There has not 
crossed over the line only a short time been, therefore, an acceptable determina-
_ before the accident and that at the time of tion of defendant's liability, and defendant 
the collision defendant's car was still travel- is entitled to a new trial on that issue. 
lng at an angle from the center line of 
about 25 degrees. Mr. Cary admitted in The judgment and order appealed from 
his testimony, moreover, that he did not are reversed. 
state to the officers investigating the acci-
dent that defendant had driven on the 
wrong side of the highway. 
SHENK, EDMONDS, SCHAUER, and 
SPENCE, J]., concur. 
BOSE v. MELODY LANE or WILSBlJI.E 
Cite u 240 P.2d 307 
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. CARTER, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The views which- I have -eXpresSed in my 
dissenting opinions iin 1.eipert .y.- Honold, 
CatSup., 240 P.2d 288, and Halnasakiv. 
Flotho, Cal.Sup., Z40 P.ld Z98,are equaIly 
applicable to this case. 
I would, therefore, affirm the order grant-
ing a new trial on the lssue of damages 
only, 
«En , ..... ""'!') 
T '" '" 
ROSE v. MELODY LANE OF 
WILSHIRE et al •• 
L. A. 21984. 
Supreme Dour! of California, In Bank. 
lan. 29, 1952. 
Hearing Granted Feb. 28; 1952. 
Jacob B. Rose brought action 'against-Mel-
ody Lane of' Wilshire. -and others, and the 
Pig'n Whistle 'Corporation to recover for .in-
juries sustained. The Superior Court of' 
Los Angeles County, -Albert F! Ross, J., en-
tered Judgment for plaintitr and order grant-
ing plalntur a ,new trial on damages issue 
only, and the Pig'n Whistle Corporation, ap.-
pealed. The Supreme Court, T_raynor. J., 
beld that damages were so inadequate as to 
show that verd'ict was result of a compro-
mise, and that therefore it was error to grant 
Umited new trial. 
Judgment and order reversed. 
Carter, J., dissented. 
Prior opinion 228 P.2d 854. 
I. Negligence <S:>32(1), 44 
Operator of cocktail room was not an 
insurer of the safety of its premises but 
was liable only for negligence in con$tnict~ 
ing, maintaining, or inspecting the prem1 
ises. 
2. Negligence <S:>136(22) 
In action against operator of cocktail 
room for injuries sustained by patron when 
chair separated from its supporting -base 
and patron fell to .the floor, whether oper-
ator of cocktail room was negligent· was 
for jury. 
• Subseqnent opinion 247 P.2d 335. 
.8. Negligence <S:>121(3) 
In action against operator of cocktail 
room for injuries sustained by patron when . 
chair separated --from its supporting base 
and patron feU to the floor, patron wa, 
entitled to rely on doctrine of reS ipsa 
loquit~r. 
4. Negllgen.e <S:>121(2) 
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies 
if accident would' not ordinarily have 
happened inabsencc of negligence and if 
defendant had exclusive' control over in· 
strumentality causing the injury. 
6. Negligence <S:>121(2) 
'Once it has been established that ac-
cident was more probably than not the 
result -of negligence, it need only be de-
termined, in order to render the 'fes ipsa 
loquitur doctrine applicable, that defend-
ant was: the sole person who could -have 
been guilty of that negligence. 
B. Negligence <S:>121(2) 
[nference of negligence under the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine is sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict against defendant, unless it 
is overcome by plaintiff's own evidence, or 
unless it is conclusively rebutted by evi-
dence that is clear, positive, uncontradicted 
and of such a nature that it cannot ration· 
ally be disbelieved. 
7. Evidence <S:>571(1) 
In action against operator of cocktail 
room for injuries sustained by patron when 
chair separated from its supporting base 
and patron fell to the floor, credibility 
of expert witness of operator of cocktail 
room and probative value of his testimony 
were questions for triers of fact. 
8. Negligence <S:>138(2) 
In action against operator of cocktail 
room for injuries sustained by patron when 
chair separated from its supporting base 
and patron, fell to the floor, patron could 
rely on res ipsa loquitur doctrine, though 
no instruction' on res ipsa loquitur was re· 
quested by patron. 
9. Negligence <S:>138(2) 
Jury may draw inference of negli-
gence _under the res ipsa loquitur doctrin~ 
w.ithput a .!ipecVfic; instruct~on _authorizing 
jury to do so. . 
